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The background of corruption dates back to 2000 years ago. Corruption takes 
the form of bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, graft, and embezzlement. 
The main medium of corruption is poorly functioning institutions, with policies 
that undermine free trade and competition.
The objectives of this article are as follows: first, to establish the impact of corruption 
regarding tender procurement; secondly, to evaluate corrupt practices which 
create dominance of particular contractors over others, and lastly, to examine 
corruption regarding the maintenance of the built environment.
The survey was limited to community development projects based in and 
around the Blantyre commercial district. The respondents were sampled for 
their knowledge, experience, education and expertise regarding community 
development projects.
The findings indicate that all tender board officials are imminently enticed into 
corrupt practices relating to their respective positions held in the organisation; 
oligopolism is the main factor in the dominance of contractors over others in the 
Malawian construction industry, and corruption leads to relatively lower fund 
allocation for the maintenance of the built environment.
The article concludes that corruption does impact on the Malawian construction 
industry in various ways. Recommendations to limit corruption include the 
implementation of the following corruption-mitigating measures: break the 
taboo against discussing corruption; demonstrate how corruption occurs; 
mobilise key constituencies, and implement anti-corruption policies.
Keywords: Corruption, bribery, tender, contractors
Abstrak
Die agtergrond van korrupsie dateer van 2000 jaar gelede. Korrupsie kom 
voor in die vorm van omkopery, afpersing, bevoordeling, voortrekkery, 
nepotisme, knoeiery en verduistering. Die hoofmedium van korrupsie is die 
swak funksionering van instellings, met beleide wat vrye handel (of bedryf) en 
kompetisie ondermyn. 
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Kenny (2007: 49) corroborates that the impact of corruption goes 
beyond bribe payments to poor quality of constructed infrastructure 
with low economic returns, and low funding for maintenance.
In the Malawi construction industry, corruption plays a major role in 
tender awards, in terms of bribery. Guash (2005: 47) concurs that 
some contractors use bribery in order to be awarded contracts. 
These bribes may in fact be a percentage of the total contract sum, 
which is high relative to its profit margin. Gulati & Rao (2006: 132) 
argue that all forms of government are susceptible to corruption 
in the form of bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, graft, and 
embezzlement.
Soreide (2006: 172) refers to oligopolistic tendencies as an art of 
corruption, in which large firms connive with other firms to dominate 
a specific market, usually infrastructure projects. 
The main objective of this article is to present the impact of corruption 
with regard to the following: tender procurement; dominance of 
some contractors over others, and the maintenance of the built 
environment.
2. Literature review
2.1 Origins of corruption
Melnikov (2008: 2) elaborates, in the Centre for International Private 
Enterprise (CIPE), on the qualification of corrupt acts and broadly 
defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for personal 
gain. He (Melnikov, 2008: 2) states that three specific conditions 
must apply for an act to be considered corrupt:
The arm’s-length principle is violated - the two•  parties in a 
transaction display bias for working with each other that is 
inconsistent with impartial treatment;
The bias or conflict of interest must be•  intentional, and
There must be some advantage for both parties to•  commit 
this violation. This advantage need not be monetary in 
nature; it could involve favouritism or non-monetary gifts.
According to Broadman & Recanatini (2000: 76), corruption is rooted 
in poorly functioning institutions, as well as in policies that undermine 
free trade and competition. 
The main parameters which drive corruption in the Malawian 
construction industry are greed, power, selfish desires, and success 
(Phiri, 2010: 1).
Acta Structilia 2010: 17(2)
110
Melnikov (2008: 2) reiterates Broadman & Recanatini’s (2000: 76) 
research findings that corruption has multiple roots, but can generally 
be attributed to the poor design of institutions. He (Melnikov 2008: 2-3) 
analyses the roots of corruption; the stages in mitigating corruption, 
and the measures to combat corruption. 
Studies by Begovic (2005: 6) on mitigating corruption state that “the 
vested interest of corrupt politicians is unlikely to be abated by any 
study”. However, Melnikov (2008: 5) lists essential mitigation measures 
as an ideal remedy.
Sullivan & Shkolnikov (2004: 234) argue that there are two measures to 
combat corruption: the demand side measures (public sector) and 
the supply side measures (private sector). Melnikov (2008: 6) concurs 
with Sullivan & Shkolnikov (2004: 234) and lists the demand side 
measures (public sector) which are likely to combat corruption.
2.2 Corruption in tender award
Phiri (2010: 93) corroborates that the Malawian construction industry 
has three commonly used forms of tender awards, namely client-
nominated award; tender board award, and appointment by the 
project committee. These forms of tender awards are subject to 
corrupt practices, and their subsequent impact is now discussed.
2.2.1 Tender manipulation
Relative to the Malawian construction industry setting, opportunities 
to influence a tender by means of corruption are grouped into the 
following two categories:
Hidden violations of procurement rules – no flaws in the • 
procurement regulations are evident, and
Misuse of legitimate deviations from procurement procedures • 
– rules of exception and exemption are exploited (Ng’ong’ola, 
Mangisoni, Wiyo & Mzandu, 2001: 35). 
The Malawian construction industry also displays two corruption-
based categories, which are particularly relevant in tender 
manipulation of infrastructure projects as contended in the business 
survey (Transparency International, 2005: 26): 
Diplomatic and political pressure, and• 
Lack of whistle-blower reactions against corruption. • 
Theoretically, the opportunities presented by the above four 
categories are present in all industries. Several surveys conducted 
by Transparency International indicate that infrastructure projects 
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are particularly prone to tender manipulation. Transparency 
Internationals’ Bribe Payers Index is the result of a survey conducted 
in 14 emerging market economies (Transparency International, 
2005: 79). During the survey, 835 business people were asked about 
the propensity of companies from 21 leading exporting countries to 
offer bribes. The sector most prone to corruption was ‘construction/
public works.’ Transparency International’s Corruption Barometer 
(Transparency International, 2005: 81) and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers’ Global Economic Crime Survey (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2005: 212) support these results, and find corruption to be 
relatively more common in infrastructure industries. 
It is important to formulate policies so that they do not exert pressure 
on firms to contravene laws and regulations in order to increase 
the competitiveness of their bid. Bid documents and contracts can 
specify costs and obligations related to regulatory compliance 
in areas such as health and safety as well as building codes and 
standards. By inserting compliance obligations in bid documents 
and contracts, regulatory compliance moves from a burden on a 
competitive bid to a service to be paid for and monitored during 
implementation.
Ng,ong’ola et al. (2001: 47) state that:
ensuring maximum competition in bidding should reduce the 
scope of collusion and therefore reduce prices. This involves 
not only ensuring competition within the process, but also 
rules banning direct negotiation with firms on the basis of 
unsolicited proposals and strict controls on renegotiation. 
Knack & Azfar (2003: 58) argue that: 
Competitive bidding alone is clearly inadequate to ensure 
better outcomes. To support the bid design process, 
whatever the level of competition, there is a significant role for 
benchmarking prices to provide guidelines for output-based 
pricing and also to provide a ‘red flag’ for overbidding.
2.2.2 Tender award methods and flaws
2.2.2.1 Client-nominated tender award
This form of tender award is ideal for selecting specialist subcontractors 
on a project.
Bloom et al. (2005: 42) explain this method of tender award as “when 
the client has the technical ability and knowhow of the project 
deliverables, he may nominate a specialist contractor to carry out 
the works as specified.” The flaws in this method are that:
Acta Structilia 2010: 17(2)
112
Clients may take prejudiced decisions – with regard to • 
state contracts, the clients representatives’ chances of 
manipulating decisions regarding award of contracts may 
easily be influenced by corrupt encounters;
Clients may repeatedly nominate a particular contractor • 
based on previous experience on similar projects undertaken 
for them – the failure to justify corrupt endeavours leading to 
the monotonous use of a particular contractor, and
Clients attain all decision-making powers – there are relatively • 
fewer individuals to bribe in order to influence the tender 
awards decision as compared to Tender board appointments 
or Project committee appointments.
Irrespective of the form of tender award, the client has the final 
say regarding project award. In client-nominated tender awards, 
there is no other party to justify the selection. Prejudice is a common 
phenomenon in client-nominated projects.
Continuous selection of a specific contractor creates dominance 
in the industry. However, competitiveness in the nomination process 
may realise balance. Emerging contractors need to be competitive 
and should be afforded the opportunity to gain experience (Bloom 
et al., 2005: 45).
The prerogative to award a project rests with the client. Although the 
vested authority is paramount to the indispensability of the client, 
power may be used or abused according to the vested interest of 
the client.
2.2.2.2 Tender board award
The tender evaluation board is a tool that produces desired results in 
appointing main contractors on projects. 
In a brief summary, the tender evaluation and assessment undergoes 
criteria, weighting, and tender submissions which are issued to the 
Tender Board Evaluation members (TBE), prior to the meeting, to 
allow for individual evaluations to be conducted. The tenderers 
comlete the score cards and the tender board members undertake 
the assessment. Ng’ong’ola et al. (2001: 31) list the following as the 
main areas of score card assessment:
Bill of Quantities (BOQ) tendered amount;• 
Current capacity, capability and past performance;• 
Occupation health and safety (OH&S) management • 
systems;
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Task appreciation and methodology, and• 
Environmental requirements.• 
The TBEs finally meet and agree on the scores relative to the assessed 
score cards; a contractor is then selected and appointed relative to 
the score card outcome.
If the score card is designed with an opinionated affiliation, then 
the variation of the scores by the TBEs will be high; and the joint 
evaluation will be biased towards the most influential members 
(Knack & Azfar, 2003: 52).
Health and safety (H&S) management has recently been 
incorporated into bid documents. Levitt & Samelson (1993), cited in 
Smallwood & Haupt (2009), advocate that H&S should be included 
as a criterion for contractors and subcontractors to pre-qualify to bid 
on projects. They state that experience indicates that pre-qualifying 
and/or selecting contractors and subcontractors, in part or on their 
expected H&S performance, will help to decrease accidents.
2.2.2.3 Appointment by the project committee
Knack & Azfar (2003: 58) argue that the project committee 
appointments are favourable for selected subcontractors who 
eventually conduct works under the jurisdiction of the main 
contractor. This also constitutes smaller bid sums relative to the main 
contractor’s contract price. 
The project committee consists of representatives from the client, 
main contractor and the project managers. The performance of 
the selected contractor is the responsibility of the main contractor; 
his payments and bond are at the onus of the main contractor.
2.3 Corruption and market dominance
2.3.1 Oligopolism
Oligopolistic competition may elicit a wide range of different 
outcomes. In some situations, the firms may employ restrictive trade 
practices, for instance collusion, and market sharing, to raise prices 
and restrict production in much the same way as a monopoly. In 
a cartel there is a formal agreement for such collusion. A primary 
example of such a cartel is the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) which has a profound influence on the international 
price of oil (Hammes & Wills, 2005: 504).
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Firms often collude in an attempt to stabilise unstable markets in 
order to reduce the risks inherent in these markets for investment and 
product development. There are legal restrictions on such collusion 
in most countries. A formal agreement for collusion to take place 
is not necessary. For instance, in some industries, there may be an 
acknowledged market leader which informally sets prices to which 
other producers respond, known as price leadership (Soreide, 2006: 
173).
2.3.2 Bribery
The construction industry in Malawi is ranked as one of the most 
corrupt industries (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Comparison of bribery in construction in selected countries
Source: Business Enterprise and Environment Project Surveys (BEEPS) (2004: 6)
Large bribes are made to gain or alter contracts and circumvent 
regulations. Kenny (2007: 49) corroborates that the impact of 
corruption goes beyond bung payments to poor quality of 
constructed infrastructure with low economic returns, and low 
funding for maintenance.
Corruption plays a major role in the awarding of contracts in 
terms of bribery. Guash (2005: 47) concurs that some contractors 
use bribery in order to be awarded contracts. These bribes may 
in fact be a percentage of the total contract sum, which is higher 
accordingly. Moon (2002: 29) agrees that corruption poses a 
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democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting 
formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies 
reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking.
In an approach based on Transparency International business 
principles, it was agreed among piping companies in Colombia’s 
water sector to reduce bribery. This resulted in significantly lower bid 
award prices for projects, with equality among the participating 
companies (Lee & Larnemark, 2007: 49).
OED (2006: 278) cited by Soreide (2006: 167) confirm the following 
examples of scandals in infrastructure procurement, including:
The Lesotho highlands water project, where the project’s • 
chief executive was found guilty of receiving bribes from 
multinationals to secure contracts, and
The telecom case in Haiti, where the President allegedly • 
received kickbacks from US telecom companies to provide 
them with benefits on infrastructure contracts.
Corruption can have a particularly invasive effect if it skews 
incentives such that the impact of corrupt payments is felt far beyond 
the project itself. It appears that corruption is a factor behind the 
pressure to overspend on new construction rather than to maintain 
existing infrastructure (Kenny, 2007: 16). 
Considering the competitive nature of the sector, there is little 
justification for state ownership of construction firms, and removing 
the government as an owner will also help to simplify the political 
economy of contract award and, in particular, monitoring for 
quality. What is known about corruption in the construction sector 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia suggests that a private sector-
dominated industry may be less prone to corruption. Evidence from 
BEEPS’ (2004: 7) surveys suggests that state-owned firms are more 
likely to bung for government contracts and licenses. 
2.4 Quality and maintenance of structures
Bloom, Chilowa, Chirwa, Lucas, Mvula, Schou & Tsoka (2005: 28) 
reiterate Datta’s (2000: 355) view that in the Malawian setting of 
district-based community development, MASAF was designed to 
disburse USD 56 Million over a five-year period. Unfortunately, due to 
the governments’ determination to accelerate implementation; the 
credit was fully committed to over a two-year period. A second loan 
was launched in 1998, and a third in 2002. The capital disbursed in all 
loan phases had no allocation for maintenance.
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Maintenance of the structures was entrusted to the communities. 
However, communities have very little understanding of maintenance 
specifications and technical expertise relative to structures. The 
capital for maintenance was not structured due to the belief that 
the built environment was to cater for the community and the 
community was to be responsible for the misuse, and therefore also 
liable for the maintenance.
A study conducted by Ng’ong’ola et al. (2001, and cited by Bloom 
et al., 2005: 28) relating to the maintenance of classroom blocks, 
boreholes and bridges constructed under MASAF reported that 
the majority of the communities were aware that they had to 
maintain the assets. Some formed maintenance committees and 
maintenance funds and requested training for their committees. 
However, they expected government to help with major repairs. 
There was uncertainty in the role of relevant Ministry departments in 
financing and carrying out repairs. The general impression was that 
maintenance issues had not been resolved.
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Sample stratum
The sample stratum consisted of three stakeholders in the form of 14 
contractors, 13 tender board officials, and 9 consulting engineers. 
A total of 36 respondents were included in the sample stratum; 
23 responses were received and included in the analysis of the 
data, which equates to a response rate of 63.9%. The 23 responses 
received included:
10 from contractors;• 
8 from tender board officials, and• 
5 from consulting engineers.• 
3.2 Case study
The projects referred to regarding this research were all community-
based development projects. Knowledge, experience and expertise 
from community-based development project officials provided the 
background of the study.
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3.3 Admissibility of the data
The data was collected from individuals, who either:
Had been in the community based development industry for • 
not less than 5 years;
Had a tertiary Diploma/Degree with respect to their field of • 
work, or
Had strong knowledge and expertise in their field of work.• 
4. Results and findings
A number of questions in the questionnaire entailed responses to a 
five-point Likert scale. The differences between the lower and upper 
ends of the five-point continuum are: 1 – Very rarely; 2 – Rarely; 3 – 
Sometimes; 4 – Often, and 5 – Very often. 
However, the extent of ranges was determined by dividing the 
number of continuums, which is 4.00, by the 5 relative points. 
Therefore the ranges between the relative points equates to 0.80.
The mean score (MS) was calculated for all data and the value was 
compared to suit the relative range. The ranges relative to the MS 
are defined as follows:
> 4.20 ≤ 5.00 (often to very often/very often);
> 3.40 ≤ 4.20 (sometimes to often/often);
> 2.60 ≤ 3.40 (rarely to sometimes/sometimes);
> 1.80 ≤ 2.60 (very rarely to rarely/rarely), and
> 1.00 ≤ 1.80 (very rarely to rarely).
4.1 Likelihood of corrupt activities relative to contractor 
registration
The questionnaire survey explored the probability of corrupt 
activities with regard to contractor registration relative to National 
Construction Industry Council (NCIC) functions. The functions include 
NCIC officers, NCIC inspectors, NCIC management, registration 
referees, and NCIC board members.
The responses to the likelihood of corrupt activities relative to the 
registration of contractors are summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1: Likelihood of bribery of NCIC functions
Activity Response (%) MS Rank
Unsure Very rarely.…………..Very often
1 2 3 4 5
Bribing the 
NCIC officers
4.3 12.0 16.3 4.3 35.9 31.5 3.59 1
Bribing the 
inspectors




7.6 27.2 37.0 7.6 19.5 8.7 2.46 3
Bribing the 
referees
2.2 45.6 22.8 2.2 19.6 9.8 2.25 4
Bribing the 
NCIC Board
10.9 51.1 28.2 10.9 7.6 2.2 1.82 5
The responses indicate that there is a likelihood of bribery relative to 
all functions. However, MSs > 3.00 indicate that the likelihood is often, 
as opposed to rarely in the case of MSs ≤ 3.00.
A MS of 1.82, which is > 1.80 ≤ 2.60 (very rarely to rarely/rarely), indicates 
that NCIC board members (1.82) are the least likely individuals to be 
bunged, followed by referees (2.25) who arbitrate the registration of 
companies, and then the NCIC management (2.46). 
A MS of 3.59, which is > 3.40 ≤ 4.20 (sometimes to often/often), 
indicates that the most likely individuals to be susceptible to bribery 
are the NCIC officers, followed by the inspectors involved in the 
registration of contractors. 64.2% (27.2%+37.0%) of the 92 respondents 
indicated that NCIC managers are very rarely and rarely susceptible 
to bribery. 
It can be deduced relative to bung-related findings that NCIC 
officers and the inspectors are the two most likely functions to be 
bunged. NCIC officers and inspectors have a similar entrance 
qualification grade, which is at technician band level. The salary 
range of this band is not as competitive; thus the likelihood of bung 
victimisation. 
The board members and NCIC managers have the same minimum 
grade of qualification and professional registration status. This 
criterion enhances the construction etiquette and work ethics 
among this band of employees; thus making them a lower potential 
target for bribery.
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4.2 Likelihood of individuals being reprimanded
The questionnaire survey investigated the likelihood of reprimand 
to be imposed on registration officers, inspectors, managers, and 
board members. This enquiry also reiterates the point that for 
an individual to be reprimanded a corrupt activity should have 
occurred. This confirms the fact that corruption does exist in the 
NCIC department.
In addition, this enquiry provides insight regarding the higher risk 
individuals into corruption in this department of the Malawian 
construction industry.
The responses to the frequency at which individuals are reprimanded 
or disciplined on grounds of corruption are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Frequency of functions being reprimanded
Function Response (%) MS Rank
Unsure Very rarely……..……..Very often
1 2 3 4 5
Registration 
officer
1.1 9.8 21.7 1.1 31 5 35.9 3.62 2
Inspector 3.2 8.7 18.5 3.2 25 0 44.6 3.78 1
Manager 1.1 40.2 30.4 1.1 18 5 9.8 2.27 3
Board member 0.0 53.3 33.7 0.0 8.7 4.3 1.77 4
A MS of 3.78, which is > 3.40 ≤ 4.20 (sometimes to often/often), 
confirms that inspector is the most reprimanded function on the 
grounds of corruption, followed by registration officer, with a MS 
within the range > 3.40 ≤ 4.20: between sometimes to often/often. 
69.6% (25%+44.6%) of the 92 respondents indicated that the most 
reprimanded function was inspector, followed closely by 67.4% 
(31.5%+35.9%) relative to registration officer.
Conversely, the results deduced that the least reprimanded function 
is board member, with a MS of 1.77, which is > 1.00 ≤ 1.80 (very rarely 
to rarely); superseded by managers (2.27). 87% (53.3%+33.7%) of the 
respondents indicated that board member is the least reprimanded 
function, while 70.6% (40.2%+30.4%) indicated that manager is the 
least reprimanded function.
The results indicate that there is more emphasis on the pointer to the 
least reprimanded than there is for the most reprimanded.
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The statistics relative to board members and managers are 
influenced by the power and authority vested in them over the fear 
by subordinates of victimisation. Senior employees are disciplined 
and reprimanded in confidence while middle management and 
technicians are reprimanded more openly. There is therefore more 
publicity regarding a junior being reprimanded than a senior being 
reprimanded.
The results confirm the previous results, namely that the most likely 
bribery source is the most reprimanded, and conversely, the most 
unlikely bribery source is the least reprimanded. The results confirm 
that the arm of the law does extend to senior employees who possess 
power and influence, thereby acknowledging that governance on 
corruption mitigation is applied to all.
3.2% of the respondents were unsure; the question concerned the 
frequency at which inspectors are reprimanded on the grounds of 
corruption. A similar version of the question was presented in Table 2, 
which attracted 12.0% of the response, indicating that respondents 
did not understand either the question or the function of the individual. 
In conclusion, the question was clear, but the understanding of the 
inspectors’ roles and responsibilities was not clear.
4.3 Likelihood of contract award due to corrupt endeavours
The objective of this section of the questionnaire was to determine 
the likelihood of corrupt endeavours influencing contract award 
relative to the different forms of project contracts in the Malawian 
construction industry. The types of project contracts addressed 
include public project contract, parastatal project contract, private 
project contract, and grant-aided project contracts.
The results of the likelihood of project contracts being award due to 
corrupt endeavours are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Likelihood of contract award due to corrupt endeavours
Project type Response (%) MS Rank
Unsure Very rarely……..……..Very often
1 2 3 4 5
Public 0.0 9.8 12.0 0.0 38.0 40.2 3.87 1
Parastatal 3.3 16.3 22.8 3.3 31.5 26.1 3.28 2
Private 16.3 22.9 31.5 16.3 14.1 15.2 2.67 3
Grant-aided 2.2 33.6 45.6 2.2 10.9 7.6 2.10 4
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The findings indicate that 78.2% (38.0%+40.2%) of the 92 interviewees 
contended that public contract awards are influenced by corrupt 
endeavours, while 79.2% (33.6%+45.6%) of the sample stated that 
grant-aided project awards, with a MS of 2.13, which is > 1.80 ≤ 
260 (rarely to neutral/rarely) are very rarely and rarely affected by 
corrupt endeavours. 
Relative to parastatal project awards, 57.6% (31.5%+26.1%) of the 
respondents contended that corrupt activities often and very 
often influence contract awards, whereas 39.1% (16.3%+22.8%) of 
the respondents declared that parastatal projects are very rarely 
and rarely influenced by corrupt activities. 3.3% of the respondents 
were not sure what the question entailed, or lacked the knowledge 
regarding parastatal projects. 18.5% (10.9%+7.6%) of the respondents 
contended that corrupt activities influence contract awards on 
grant-aided projects. Alternatively, the MS of 3.28, which is > 2.60 
≤ 3.40, indicates that the influence can be between rarely to 
sometimes/sometimes.
54.4% (22.9%+31.5%) of the respondents stated that private contract 
awards are very rarely and rarely influenced by corrupt activities, 
whereas 29.3% (14.1%+15.2%) responded that private contract 
awards are often and very often influenced by corrupt activities. 
The MS of 2.67, which is > 2.60 ≤ 3.40, indicates that the influence is 
between rarely to sometimes/sometimes.
In essence, corrupt activities do occur in the awarding of contracts 
relative to the four project types. The difference lies in the extent to 
which it occurs.
4.4 Efficiency of common corruption mitigation measures
The responses clarified the efficiency of corruption mitigation 
measures on a five-point Likert scale, the continuum spanning 
from 1 - Completely ineffective; 2 - Nearly ineffective; 3 - Neutral; 
4 - Effective, and 5 - Very effective.
The responses relative to the efficiency of common corruption 
mitigation measures are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 indicates that 86.9% (52.2%+38.8%) of the 92 respondents 
identified dismissals as the most effective measure of mitigating 
corruption, with a MS > 3.40 ≤ 4.20 (neutral to effective/effective); 
whereas the least effective method of mitigating corruption was the 
publishing of names (2.00).
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The second most effective corruption mitigating measure with a 
MS of 3.89, which is > 3.40 ≤ 4.20 (neutral to effective effective) as 
denoted from this survey was civil action, with 76.1% (42.4%+33.7%) 
of the sample noting that civil action is effective and very effective 
in mitigating corruption. 
Thirdly, the MS of suspensions falls within the range > 3.40 ≤ 4.20: 
between neutral to effective/effective.
Table 4: Degree of effectiveness of mitigation measures
Mitigation measure Response (%) MS Rank
Unsure Completely ineffective….…..Very 
effective
1 2 3 4 5
Dismissals 2.1 2.2 8.7 2.1 52.2 34.8 4.09 1
Civil action 3.3 0 20.6 3.3 42.4 33.7 3.89 2
Suspensions 2.2 7.6 17.4 2.2 45.6 27.2 3.67 3
Training 8.7 6.5 18.5 8.7 48.9 17.4 3.52 4
Poster awareness 6.5 0.0 37.0 6.5 33.7 22.8 3.42 5
Increase in salaries 1.1 22.8 28.3 1.1 27.2 20.6 2.95 6
Publishing of names 0.0 42.4 30.4 0.0 19.5 7.6 2.00 7
Finally, these results suggest that there is a degree of confidence 
with regard to measures used to mitigating corruption. 
5. Conclusion
Corruption is relatively rampant in the Malawian construction industry. 
Mitigation measures, as listed in Melnikov (2008: 4) relative to the 
NCIC, confirm the results that reprimanding of corrupt individuals 
does occur, and that measures to combat corrupt activities are in 
place, but their implementation is questionable.
Tender award is the epitome of corruption in the Malawian 
construction industry. As indicated in the results, tender board 
members are crucial in making or breaking a contractor in terms 
of contract award. The findings in the literature review concur that 
corruption plays a major role in the awarding of contracts in terms 
of bribery. Guash (2005: 47) reiterates that some contractors use 
bribery in order to be awarded contracts. 
The bribes may in fact be a percentage of the total contract sum, 
which is on higher accordingly. In the review of related literature, 
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however, Moon (2002: 29) agrees that corruption poses a serious 
threat to development. In the political realm, corruption undermines 
democracy and good governance by flouting, or even subverting 
formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies 
reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking.
The research indicates that all active personnel in tender awards 
have experienced relative pressure to indulge in corrupt practices.
Regarding dominance of certain contractors over others, the 
research findings indicate that contracts are more likely to be 
awarded to contractors who bribe and influence contract decisions 
due to corrupt practices. One form of this corrupt practice in the 
Malawian construction industry is oligopolism.
Firms often collude in an attempt to stabilise unstable markets, in 
order to reduce the risks inherent in these markets for investment 
and product development. Although there are legal restrictions 
relative to such collusion in most countries, a formal agreement is 
not necessary for collusion to take place (Soreide, 2006: 173).
Finally, regarding maintenance of structures, a study conducted 
by Ng’ong’ola et al. (2001, and cited by Bloom et al., 2004: 28), 
relating to the maintenance of classroom blocks, boreholes and 
bridges constructed under MASAF, reported that the majority of the 
communities were aware that they had to maintain the assets. Some 
formed maintenance committees, established maintenance funds, 
and requested training for their committees. However, they expected 
government to help with major repairs. There was uncertainty as to 
the role of the relevant Ministry departments financing and carrying 
out repairs. The general impression was that maintenance issues 
had not been resolved.
In conclusion, this article presented the adverse effects and impact 
of corruption in the Malawian construction industry with regard 
to tender procurement, dominance of certain contractors over 
others, and below par quality, and the maintenance of the built 
environment.
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